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ABSTRACT 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND MARKETS 
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LINUS M. NYIWUL, B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF BUEA 
 
M.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO 
 
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor John Stranlund 
 
This dissertation consists of two theoretical papers on market-based 
environmental policy. The first paper exploits the correlation between the environmental 
performance of firms and their economic performance to show that financial markets can 
be used to help enforce environmental policy and to design more efficient regulations. 
The results indicate that when markets punish firms for not complying with 
environmental standards, environmental regulators can exploit this by setting stricter 
standards. In fact, it is possible for the regulator to use market-driven enforcement to 
reduce a firm’s emissions and monitoring of the firm simultaneously. The second paper 
provides a theoretical analysis of the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’ 
emissions are not perfectly observable. The purpose is to examine how the optimal tax is 
affected by enforcement costs and the market structure. We obtain the result that market 
imperfections and enforcement costs push the optimal tax lower than the marginal 
damage when the number of firms in the market is exogenous. However, when the 
number of firms is determined endogenously enforcement costs generate two 
countervailing effects on the optimal tax. The overall effect of enforcement costs on the 
optimal tax depends on the strength of direct relative to indirect effects when there is free 
entry and exit. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
EXPLOITING FINANCIAL MARKETS TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 
1.1 Introduction 
Analytical and empirical studies have identified a correlation between the 
environmental performance of firms and their economic performance. Good environmental 
performance in these studies refers to consistent compliance or over-compliance with 
environmental standards and/or the adoption of effective voluntary programs. Measures of 
economic performance vary from profit to stock market measures. Positive or negative effects 
of environmental performance on economic performance suggest that markets can be exploited 
to help enforce environmental policies and to design more efficient regulations. In this paper 
we examine environmental standard setting with both regulatory and market-driven 
enforcement. A unique feature of the model is that we consider a conventional emissions 
standard for a firm combined with a stricter standard with which the regulator certifies that the 
firm is over-compliant. We demonstrate how regulators may be able to exploit market penalties 
and rewards for environmental performance to pursue more stringent environmental 
regulations.  
Empirical studies that attempt to link financial performance to environmental 
performance have focused in large part on correlation and regression analysis (for example, 
Mamingi et al., 2006; Al-Tuwaijri et al, 2004). There also has been emphasis on event studies, 
which emphasizes the impact on a firm’s financial measure before and after incidents of 
violations or recognition for good environmental performance (for example, Hamilton, 1995; 
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Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Laplante et al, 1994; Bosch et al, 1998).1 There is evidence that 
announcements or disclosure of violations result in negative security price movements across 
all industries (Shane, Spicer & Barry, 1983; Konar and Cohen, 1997, 2001; Gupta and Goldar, 
2005; Dasgupta et al, 2001; 2006). The difference in the intensity of movements in firm value 
reflects investors’ anticipation of the subsequent effects on the costs of abatement (Ditz, 2002; 
Laplante & Lanoie, 1994; Patten and Nance, 1998). Moreover, there is evidence that firms 
exposed to large negative effects of violations subsequently reduce their emissions more than 
their industry peers (Konar and Cohen, 1997).  
Violations often result in lawsuits, whose settlement and/or subsequent investments in 
abatement invoke a negative reaction from investors (Muoghalu, 1990; Badrinath & Bolster, 
1996). Violations, as well as lawsuits often lead to penalties, and like lawsuits, regulatory 
penalties have been shown to cause a fall in a firm’s value (Hughes, 2000). Even challenging 
the lawsuits or contesting regulatory penalties further erodes the value of a firm (Bosch et al, 
1998).  
On the other hand, good environmental performance positively correlates with firm 
value (Al-Tuwaijri et al, 2004; Russo et al, 1997; Gupta and Goldar, 2005; Khanna and Anton, 
2002; Salama, 2005; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Hamilton, 1995; Feldman et al, 1996), as 
does good environmental record keeping; for example, extensive disclosures of the 
environmental impact of a firm’s activities (Blacconiere et al, 1994). A good record of 
                                                 
1 An event-study assesses the impact of new information on stock prices by measuring the 
changes in the average of the stock prices when such information (event) is made public 
(McWilliams et al, 1999). It uses the ‘efficient capital market’ model, which assumes that 
security prices are likely to reflect all the available information about the future profit of a 
given firm. Event-studies aim to isolate any abnormal stock returns associated with the release 
of a specific piece of information. 
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environmental performance reduces financial risks to firms (Halkos and Sepetis, 2007) and 
attracts investors seeking “greener’ investments (Barnea et al, 2005).2 
A firm’s environmental performance also has implications for its performance in 
product markets. It has been shown that the demand for goods is negatively affected by 
noncompliance (Stafford, 2007).  High polluting industries, especially those with greater 
consumer contact, often tend to have higher participation rates in voluntary programs (Arora 
and Cason, 1996).  
The ability of firms to exploit gains in emissions abatement for economic and financial 
advantage offers environmental regulators a unique opportunity to enhance and complement 
existing regulations to increase their effectiveness. Firms with the potential to achieve higher 
abatement levels can be targeted with regulatory and market-oriented incentives. A program 
with this characteristic is the National Environmental Performance Track (NEPT), which is an 
exclusive club of over-compliant firms aimed at promoting their abatement achievements with 
the assistance of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Over-compliance data for this 
program is being used by financial advisory and investment firms. Another approach to 
promote ‘green’ investments has been the introduction of stock market indices that focus on 
                                                 
2 Other efforts to establish a market value for environmental performance have focused on 
measuring a firm’s performance and exposure through a set of performance indicators and 
checklists (Repetto & Austin, 2000). However, such checklists provide no informative link 
between a firm’s environmental performance and its market value. A related approach uses 
these performance indicators to produce a ratings system, and firms are ranked according to 
some index or category. For example, financial advisory and investment firms such as Trucost, 
Innovest, Calvert, KLD, etc help companies and investors measure the environmental impacts 
of business activities in quantitative and financial terms using performance ratings.  
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the use of abatement technologies. For example, WilderHill Energy Index tracks the clean 
energy sector.3 
In this paper, we focus on the implications of the link between environmental and 
financial performance. The positive relationship between financial and environmental 
performance identified in empirical work suggests that firms that over-comply with 
environmental standards are rewarded in financial markets while noncompliant firms are 
punished by these markets. We demonstrate how market-driven enforcement complements and 
contributes to the objectives of conventional environmental regulation. The role of monitoring 
and enforcement on compliance with conventional standards is well documented (for example 
see Shimshack & Ward, 2008; Stranlund et al, 2009). But there is no work that addresses 
whether market-driven enforcement can be exploited in the design of environmental 
regulations. We show that the regulator can combine conventional regulatory enforcement, 
financial market forces, and certification for over-compliance to achieve better environmental 
performance.  
Our results show that market enforcement can be exploited to set stricter emissions 
standards. In particular certifying the achievement of over-compliance can lead to improved 
environmental quality. Furthermore, market enforcement allows the regulator to reduce 
monitoring effort while simultaneously setting a stricter single emissions standard. Setting two 
emissions standards - over-compliance and regular standards - is a more efficient policy option 
than a single emissions standard, and it results in better environmental quality. However, 
setting two emissions standards may require an increase in monitoring effort.  
 
                                                 
3 See http://www.wildershares.com/ 
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 1.2 The Analytical Framework: Emissions Standards and Compliance 
Throughout the analysis we focus on environmental standard setting and enforcement 
for a single risk neutral firm. Suppose the market value of the firm, given a level of emissions 
e, is )(ew , which is strictly concave. Let ne  denote the firm’s emissions level when it does not 
control its emissions; that is, ne  is the solution to 0)(/ ew  - the level of emissions which 
maximizes the firm’s per share value.  Note that 0)(/ ew  for nee  .  The firm’s emissions 
produce environmental damage )(ed , which is strictly increasing and strictly convex.  
For simplicity the payoff and damage functions are assumed to be quadratic functions. 
Thus, their marginals have the following linear forms:  
                                                        
edded
ewwew
///
///
)(
)(


         (1) 
where //,, wdw , and //d  are all positive constants. We assume throughout that dw  , so that it 
will never be optimal to completely eliminate the firm’s emissions. In this section the firm 
faces a single emissions standard s which forbids emissions above that level. The firm is 
compliant if se  , but it is noncompliant if se  . To counteract the firm’s incentive to not 
comply with the standard the government monitors and enforces the emissions standard. 
Monitoring may involve onsite inspections and evaluating self- reporting by the firm of its 
abatement activities. 
 Enforcement here means that a violation of the standard is punished with a fixed fine. 
The government monitors the firm with a probability ]1,0( . There are no errors in 
monitoring, That is, there are no type 1 or type 2 errors. The firm pays a government-mandated 
fine, p , when it is caught cheating. A fixed government-mandated penalty for violation is 
suitable for our model for a couple of reasons. First, it avoids uncertainty for the firm when it 
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makes compliance decisions so that the firm has perfect information about the benefits and 
costs of compliance and noncompliance. Secondly, penalties (and/or the guidelines on how 
they can be imposed) are usually set out in advance in the form of legislation or order. Changes 
to such legislation within a reasonable time may be difficult. Also, applying penalties 
indiscriminately may expose the regulator to costly litigation. 
  In addition, the stock market punishes the firm for noncompliance through divestment 
by investors.4 This leads to a loss, m , in the market value of its assets. We refer to this as 
market enforcement of the standard. The market relies on government monitoring for signals 
about the firm’s compliance status. Thus the market penalty is applied only when the 
government discovers that the firm has violated the standard. Furthermore, we assume that the 
effects of the government-mandated penalty and market punishment are separable.  
The government incurs monitoring costs of,  , where   is constant marginal 
monitoring costs. There are no costs of penalizing the firm if it is caught in violation. 5  
Because the government and market penalties are fixed values that do not depend on 
the firm’s choice of emissions, the firm’s compliance decision is binary. The firm either 
complies with the standard by choosing e s  or it violates the standard by not reducing its 
emissions, that is, by choosing ne e .  We make the common assumption that the firm will 
comply with the standard if it is indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. 
Therefore, the firm is compliant if and only if its payoff from complying with the standard is 
                                                 
4 This could also be a loss in value because some consumers leave the firm. 
5 Cohen (1986) in a study of the prevention of oil pollution in US coastal waters estimated that 
the marginal cost of preventing one gallon of oil to be $5.50. Of this amount, only $3.98 is the 
cost to the industry associated with additional prevention effort. The remaining $1.52 is the 
enforcement cost associated with the US Coast guard having to operate more frequent patrols.  
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not less than its expected payoff when it violates the standard; that is, 
)()()( mp
newsw   . Alternatively, the firm complies if and only if  
                                               )()()( mp
n swew   .     (2) 
The interpretation of equation (2) is that the firm complies if and only if the gain from 
noncompliance, )()( swew n  , is not greater than the expected penalty for noncompliance, 
)( mp   .   
Throughout we assume that it is efficient from society’s point of view that the firm 
reduce its emissions below ne . Given the all-or-nothing nature of the firm’s compliance 
decision, this implies that the government chooses   and s  so that the firm is compliant. 
Moreover, to economize on monitoring costs the government chooses   and s  so that (2) 
holds with equality. This implicitly defines the amount of monitoring necessary to motivate the 
firm to comply with some standard s, given the penalties m  and p ; that is,  
                                                    .)()()(
mp
n swews  
       (3) 
Obviously we have to have ]1,0[)( s . ( ) 0s   is guaranteed by ( ) ( )nw e w s . Moreover, 
if   1]/[)]()([  mpn swew  , then the firm violates the standard even if 1  .  This 
outcome would violate our assumption that it will be efficient to reduce the firm’s emissions. 
This implies that if 1]/[)]()([  mpn swew   for some s, the government needs to reduce 
the standard so that 1]/[)]()([  mpn swew  . 
 Using (3) note that  
   0)()(
/
/  mp
sws   ,     (4)  
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which indicates that the monitoring necessary to achieve compliance is monotonically 
decreasing in the emissions standard. This is intuitive because a stricter standard increases the 
firm’s motivation to cheat, which increases the monitoring required to ensure compliance with 
the standard.  
To determine the optimal emissions standard for the firm the regulator maximizes the 
difference between the firm’s payoff and damages and monitoring costs, subject to e s  and 
(3). Thus, the regulator’s problem can be expressed as 
   )()()(max ssdsw
s
 .     (5) 
Using (4) the first order condition for an interior choice of s can be written as  
   0)()()(
/
//  mp
swswsd 
 .     (6) 
Denote the solution to (6) as rs . Using the linear forms of 
/d  and /w  from (1) and (6) we can 
solve for rs explicitly:  
   //// dAw
dAwsr 
 ,  where 
mp
A 

1 .    (7) 
From here on we refer to rs as the regular standard. The first-best emissions standard —
the standard that equates )(/ sw  and )(/ sd — can be determined from (7) by setting marginal 
monitoring costs   equal to zero. The first best- standard is 1s  in Figure 1. For 0  , it is 
straightforward to show that rs  is increasing in  . This reflects the well-known fact that it is 
optimal to set a less strict standard when the marginal cost of enforcing compliance with the 
standard is greater.  
 It is also straightforward to show that rs  is decreasing in the regulatory and market 
penalties for noncompliance. Hence, when markets punish firms for not complying with 
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environmental standards, environmental regulators can exploit this by setting stricter standards. 
Our regular standard rs  and the optimal standard in the absence of market penalties, 2s , are 
graphed in Figure 1 with the use of equation (6).  
 The final task of this section is to determine if market enforcement of environmental 
standards allows a regulator to reduce its enforcement effort. There are two countervailing 
effects at work in the answer to this question. First, holding a standard constant, an additional 
market penalty for noncompliance allows the regulator to reduce the amount of monitoring it 
must expend to keep the firm compliant. However, a market penalty implies that the optimal 
emissions standard should be stricter, which will tend to increase the monitoring requirement. 
To determine which effect dominates, using (3), monitoring at standards rs , rs and 2s  are  
mp
r
n
r
swews  
 )()()( and 
p
n swews 
)()()( 22
  respectively. Substitute the quadratic forms 
of the linear equations for /d  and /w  from (1) into )( rs  and )( 2s  to obtain 
 .)]()([)(2 )]()()[()()()( 2////2//////
2////2//2////
2 
 

mpmppp
pmpm
r wdwdw
wdwdwwd
ss  
Note that )()( 2ssr    in the absence of market enforcement; that is, when 0m . However, 
when 0m , )].()()[()]()([ 2////2//2 pmpr wdwsignsssign    This relationship 
suggests that it may be possible to use market-driven enforcement to reduce a firm’s emissions 
and monitoring of the firm simultaneously. The latter is more likely when marginal monitoring 
costs are relatively small and/or regulatory and market penalties are relatively large. 
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Figure 1: An Optimal Emissions Standard with Market-Driven Enforcement 
 
1.3 Market-Driven Enforcement Allows the Setting of an Over-compliance Standard 
We have established that the regulator can exploit market punishment of environmental 
violations to set stricter emissions standards. In this section, we show how it might be possible 
for a regulator to set an even stricter standard by which it certifies that a firm is over-
compliant. Over-compliance refers to environmental performance beyond the requirements of 
a regular emissions standard. Over-compliance is optional for the firm, but the firm may find it 
worthwhile if financial markets reward this choice.  
It is worth noting that several other reasons for firms’ over-compliance, especially with 
voluntary programs, have been advanced in a different context in the literature. These reasons 
include pressure to appeal to “green” consumers (Stafford, 2007; Videras & Alberini, 2000; 
Arora & Cason,1996), to pre-empt regulation, to seek relief from the regulatory authority, and 
to gain an advantage over competitors (Videras & Alberini, 2000). However, it can be 
successfully argued that all these reasons for firm’s over-compliance also boosts the firm’s 
$  
Emissions 
)(/ ed  
)(/ ew  
mp
rsw



)(/  
os  
mpg
osw



)(/  
rs  1s  
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valuation and hence its share price. So the results of this paper may have applications in these 
other settings as well.  
Suppose the firm now faces two standards, a regular standard rs  and an over-
compliance standard os , with ro ss 0 . Note that the regular standard here does not have an 
overbar as in the last section. We remove it when denoting the regular standard when there is 
also an over-compliance standard. Suppose that if the firm reduces its emissions to the over-
compliance standard and is audited by the regulator that the regulator makes the firm’s over-
compliance public through some sort of certification. Upon learning of this certification 
investors incorporate this information into their decisions. Financial advisory firms commonly 
employ such information in their business risk analysis. Suppose further that the financial 
markets reward the firm with an increase in the market value of g when it is revealed that the 
firm has reached the over-compliance standard.  Note that the firm’s expected payoff from 
reaching the over-compliance standard is gosw )( .  
An example of a program that promotes over-compliance is the EPA’s National 
Environmental Performance Track (NEPT), which is an exclusive club of over-compliant 
firms. Since this program motivates the forthcoming analysis, it is worth describing NEPT. We 
then proceed to lay out what we believe would be an effective approach for the program.  
In its basic form, NEPT simply groups facilities that have demonstrated consistent 
compliance with existing regulations, voluntarily implemented programs (for example 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS)) to increase abatement, and can make verifiable 
commitments to improve on that performance.  Facilities make independent choices for 
abatement objectives and self report achievements within a certain time period.  The program 
is promoted through the use of administrative and market-oriented incentives. For example, 
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members are afforded administrative incentives such as low priority for inspection targeting 
purposes and discretion in assessing penalties for violations. Market-oriented incentives 
include the use of the NEPT logo for marketing purposes, awards for best performers and the 
use of over-compliance data by financial advisory and investment firms such as Innovest, 
Trucost, Calvert and KLD in their evaluation of the business risks associated with the 
environmental costs of pollution related activities.6 Membership in the program therefore 
indicates low risk of a violation compared to non-members. 
A potential weakness of the program is that over-compliance is relative; it is not a 
unique predetermined target to be achieved by a firm. In the case of a specific pollutant it is 
just a measure of how far the firm’s emissions are below the emissions standard. Because over-
compliance is not a unique target to be achieved there is little incentive for a firm to increase 
its emissions standard/over-compliance gap.  In other words, a firm may simply strive for 
minimum over-compliance performance to enjoy the administrative and market-oriented 
benefits.  
Suppose instead that over-compliance is achieved by attaining a certain over-
compliance standard below the regular standard. Just like in the case of the regular standard, 
this over-compliance standard is monitored and enforced. A firm that achieves this over-
compliance standard receives a certification for its achievement from the regulator. We wish to 
determine whether the regulator can set an over-compliance standard that the firm will find 
optimal to achieve. Suppose the regulator has set a regular standard that the firm would comply 
with. This requires that the regulator monitors the firm so that the detection probability is 
                                                 
6 National Environmental Performance Track (NEPT),  
http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/benefits/investing.htm.  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2000. “Green Dividends? The Relationship Between 
Firms’ Environmental Performance and Financial Performance”, Washington D.C. 
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)( rs  defined by (3). Given )( rs , the firm will comply with an over-compliance standard if 
and only if  
                                          0)()()(  rgro swssw                                                (8) 
Since )(sw is increasing in s, there exist ro ss  such that (8) holds as long as .0g  This is 
an important result that suggests that if a firm will comply with a regular standard, there is a 
stricter over-compliance standard that it will be motivated to achieve without the need for 
additional enforcement pressure. Simply setting the standard and certifying that the firm has 
met it improves environmental performance without additional public resources. 
1.4 Optimal Over-Compliance 
Of course, the regular standard, the over-compliance standard, and monitoring to support 
compliance with both should all be chosen optimally. That is the task of this section. To begin, 
note from (8) that given sr and )( rs , the strictest over-compliance standard the firm will 
comply with is determined by  
   0)()()(  rgro swssw  .     (9) 
Under the assumption that the regulator would like to guarantee that the firm will reduce its 
emissions to the over-compliance standard, we impose (8) on the design of the optimal policy. 
Note that choosing sr gives us so through equation (9) and )( rs  through equation (3). Thus, 
all the elements of the optimal policy follow from choosing the optimal regular standard sr.  
 Proceeding accordingly, (8) implicitly defines the over-compliance standard as a 
function of the regular standard, ( )o rs s . Then the optimal policy is found by first choosing sr to 
maximize 
 14 
                                                   )())(())(( rroro sssdssw  .                                 (10) 
The first-order condition is 
            0)()()]()([ ////  rrooo ssssdsw  .                    (11) 
The optimal values of os , rs , and   are the simultaneous solutions to (10), (8), and (3).  
 Toward characterizing the optimal policy to induce over-compliance, first use (8) to 
obtain 
)(
)()(
)( /
//
/
o
grr
ro sw
ssw
ss
 .  From (4), / /( ) ( ) /( )r r p ms w s     . Substituting this 
into )(/ ro ss yields 
         0
)(
)()( /
/
/ 





mp
mpg
o
r
ro sw
swss 

.              (12) 
The sign of (12) simply indicates that the over-compliance standard is lower as the regular 
standard is lower. Substitute (12) and / /( ) ( ) /( )r r p ms w s      into the first order condition 
(11) and rearrange the result to obtain 
                     0)(1)( // 



 ompgo
sdsw 
 .             (13) 
Using the linear forms of )(/ osw and )(
/
osd  from (1), solving (13) yields the optimal over-
compliance emissions standard  
                 //// dBw
dBwso 
 , where .1
mpg
B 

           (14)                              
 Compare (14) to (7) and note that the optimal over-compliance standard has the same 
basic structure as rs ,  the regular standard when the regulator does not also set an over-
compliance standard. Since the firm complies with os  when the regulator sets it as the over-
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compliance standard, but it complies with rs  when the regulator does not set the over-
compliance standard, comparing the two tells us whether the firm chooses lower emissions 
when faced with os .  Note that os  differs from rs  only by the inclusion of g . It is 
straightforward to show that os  is strictly decreasing in g . Since o rs s  for 0g , o rs s  
for 0g . This is graphed in Figure 2. Thus, the optimal environmental performance of the 
firms is improved when a regulator can exploit financial market rewards by setting and 
certifying compliance with an over-compliance standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: An Optimal Over-Compliance Standard 
 
 
 
1.5 Effects of Setting Two Emissions Standards on Monitoring Probability and the 
Regular Standard 
 
We have argued that setting two standards is good policy. In the case of only the 
regular standard, it is possible to reduce monitoring if market penalties are large relative to the 
marginal monitoring costs. However, an over-compliance standard is a stricter standard, which 
may require increased monitoring. In this section we determine whether setting two emissions 
standards; an over-compliance standard and a regular standard may result in lower or higher 
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overall standard. The conclusion here will be a guide to understanding whether the monitoring 
probability will increase or decrease under the two-standards scenario.  
First, recall that we have derived an optimal over-compliance emissions standard in (8) 
for a regulator setting two standards. To obtain a regular emissions standard in this context, 
which is now a function of the over-compliance standard, we consider the quadratic forms of 
the linear equations set out in (1) for emissions. The quadratic equations for payoffs from the 
various compliance choices – noncompliance, compliance and over-compliance – can be 
written as: 2
//
2
)( ewwewew n  , 2
//
2
)( rrr s
wwswsw  , 2
//
2
)( ooo s
wwswsw  .  The 
maximum level of emissions possible for the firm can be expressed as /// wwe  , where 
/// ww is the solution to 0)(/ ew . Substitute /// wwe   and the quadratic forms for )( rsw , 
)( osw  into equation (8) to obtain 
0
)(22
)()(
2 //
2
2
//
2
//



mp
g
oor
mp
gmp
r
mp
gmp
w
w
swwsswsw 





.              (15) 
The equality in (15) assumes that the government chooses os , rs  and monitoring probability to 
minimize monitoring costs.    
Furthermore, equation (14) can be re-written as 
//// )()(
)()(
dw
dw
s
gmpgmp
gmpgmp
o 


  .  
Substituting os into equation (15) and solving for rs  yields  
]))([(
)()()(
////////
////2
1
2
1
// 

wwdw
dwwd
w
ws
gmp
gmpmp
r 
 .                                         (16) 
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We can now compare the regular standard obtained from setting a single emissions 
standard, rs
__
 (represented by equation 7) and the minimum emissions standard that results 
from setting two emissions standards ( rs  from equation (16)). rs
__
is the single emissions 
standard that obtains under government and market punishment while rs is the minimum 
regular standard resulting from two emissions standards under combined government 
enforcement and market rewards.  The difference between rs
__
and rs can be expressed as: 
////////////
////2
1
2
1
// )()(
)()(
]))([(
)()()(
][
dw
dw
wwdw
dwwd
w
wss
mpmp
mpmp
gmp
gmpmp
rr 





 . 
The sign of ][ rr ss  can be expressed as: 
])())([(][ //2
1
2
1
////  wwdSignssSign pmgpmrr  .  (17) 
Equation (17) suggests that rr ss
__  only if marginal monitoring costs are large relative to 
penalties or penalties are relatively small compared to monitoring costs. In these cases, then 
using the feature in (4) that the monitoring probability is monotonically decreasing in the 
emissions standard, we can conclude that setting two standards may result in a higher 
probability of monitoring than under a single regular emissions standard. rr ss   implies rs  is 
a stricter emissions standard than rs . As discussed earlier, a stricter emissions standard is more 
difficult to achieve.  There is a greater incentive to cheat at a stricter standard and therefore 
increased enforcement is required to deter cheating.  This result means that in setting two 
standards the regulator may need to monitor more, but better environmental quality and a more 
efficient outcome are achieved.  
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1.6 Conclusions and Further Research 
In this paper we have demonstrated how regulators may be able to exploit market 
penalties and rewards for environmental performance to pursue more stringent environmental 
regulations. Better environmental performance can be achieved using a combination of 
conventional regulatory enforcement, financial market forces, and certification for over-
compliance.  
Since markets punish firms for non-compliance with environmental standards and 
reward good performance, regulators can exploit this by setting stricter standards. In particular 
certifying the achievement of over-compliance can lead to improved environmental 
performance. Market enforcement allows the regulator to reduce monitoring effort while 
simultaneously setting a stricter single emissions standard. Setting two emissions standards - 
over-compliance and regular standards - is a more efficient policy option than a single 
emissions standard, and it results in better environmental quality. However, setting two 
emissions standards may require an increase in monitoring.  
A possible area of further research in the work presented here relates to the implicit 
assumption that the firm’s emissions are deterministic. An important question is what if the 
firm’s emissions are random or consist of a random component? This randomness may affect 
the probabilities of monitoring for the regulator and therefore may necessitate enforcement 
strategies different from those adopted here. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS ON AN 
EMISSIONS TAX 
2.1 Introduction 
The well established theoretical prescription that efficiency of pollution control policy 
requires an emissions tax equal to marginal damage (Pigouvian tax) be imposed on polluters is 
based on competitive market assumptions. This equality between an emissions tax and 
marginal damage does not hold in a non-competitive setup and when the firm’s emissions are 
not perfectly observable. A good deal of analysis on emissions taxes often assume that 
emissions are perfectly observable, monitored and that the tax is enforced at no cost to the 
regulatory authority. However, emissions are typically unobservable, prompting the regulator 
to enforce a tax on emissions to prevent or at least minimize cheating. Costly enforcement 
ultimately distorts the optimal emissions tax away from marginal damage. The purpose of the 
paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’ 
emissions are not perfectly observable under both perfect competition and Cournot 
competition, with and without free market entry. The focus on these two market structures is 
important; the Cournot model provides a very simple link between perfect competition and 
monopoly models. This crucial link lies in the firms’ ability to charge a price premium. 
Several authors have explored the concept of the effects of market structure on the 
Pigouvian tax on polluting firms. A pollution tax on a monopoly has two effects; it induces a 
welfare gain from reduced pollution but there is a welfare loss due to reduced output (Oates 
and Strassmann, 1984). Hence, the use of a Pigouvian tax involves a tradeoff between reduced 
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emissions and reduced output. These two welfare effects imply that a tax on emissions could, 
in fact, induce a net welfare loss.  
When the firm responds to the tax by reducing output, particularly in an imperfectly 
competitive market, the result is an optimal tax that falls short of marginal social damage. The 
amount by which the optimal tax falls short of marginal damage depends on the price elasticity 
of demand. But even when the market is imperfectly competitive and the firm responds to the 
imposition of a tax by increasing abatement, the result is an optimal tax equal to marginal 
social damage (Barnett, 1980; Lee, 1975). These results hold for a fixed number of firms in the 
industry. 
However, the size of the market affects the nature of an optimal emissions tax. The 
number of entrants in free-entry equilibrium can either be excessive, insufficient, or optimal. In 
the absence of the emissions tax the equilibrium number of firms is predicted to be greater than 
the optimal number of firms (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). An emissions tax pushes the 
equilibrium number of firms closer to the optimal number of firms, which has the effect of 
increasing welfare. If this welfare effect is strong enough, the optimal emissions tax may 
exceed marginal damage (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995). 
The three welfare effects of the emissions tax cited above assume that emissions are 
perfectly observable and the tax is costlessly enforced. Emissions taxes are usually based on 
self-reported emissions by polluting firms. Often, there is an incentive for firms to under-report 
their emissions and pay less taxes. A common attempt to prevent this problem is to enforce the 
tax by establishing a mechanism to verify that firms are indeed reporting their true level of 
emissions and hence are paying the right amount of tax. This monitoring activity is costly to 
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the regulator, for example it takes manpower to set up and run audits. How this costly 
monitoring affects the optimal tax is the subject matter of this piece of work.  
The results indicate that when the number of firms in the industry is determined 
exogenously, enforcing an emissions tax results in an optimal tax rate smaller than the social 
marginal damage when there are no market imperfections. Enforcement pushes the optimal tax 
lower than marginal damage because enforcing the tax adds to the social cost of pollution 
control. The optimal tax reduces further when there are market imperfections. The implication 
is that an optimal tax rate imposed on a fixed number of firms with some market power would 
have to be adjusted downward to account for product market distortions and enforcement costs. 
Enforcement costs have direct and indirect effects, with a countervailing influence on 
the optimal tax when entry is endogenous. The direct effect of enforcement costs derives from 
a higher marginal enforcement cost of inducing lower emissions, which pushes the optimal tax 
lower. The indirect effect of enforcement costs results from the role of the tax as a deterrent to 
entry. This indirect effect is positive and hence pushes the optimal tax up. The optimal tax is 
greater than marginal damage if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of enforcement 
costs. Alternatively, the optimal tax would be smaller than marginal damage if the indirect 
effect falls short of the direct effect of enforcement costs.  
2.2 The Basic Model: Emissions Tax, Enforcement and Individual Choices of Output and 
Abatement 
In this section we model the behavior of oligopolistic firms that compete in Cournot 
fashion. Consider n identical Cournot firms. Each firm faces a tax t on their reported emissions, 
ir . Firms always have the incentive to under-report their emissions and therefore pay lower 
taxes; thus, the emissions tax must be enforced. A firm under-reports its emissions when self-
 22 
reported emissions are smaller than actual emissions, that is, ii er  where ie is i’s emissions of 
some uniformly mixed pollutant. The regulator establishes a mechanism to verify that firms are 
indeed reporting their true level of emissions and hence are paying the right amount of tax. 
Each firm faces a constant expected marginal penalty, denoted , for violations. Requiring the 
expected marginal penalty for violations to be constant is a special assumption intended to 
simplify the analysis here. This assumption is also associated with our use of results found in 
Stranlund et al (2009).  
In monitoring and enforcing an emission standard the regulator incurs )(k in 
enforcement costs, which are a function of the constant expected marginal penalty a firm faces 
for any cheating. We assume that monitoring the firm’s emissions is without error; only firms 
that cheat and are audited will be caught and punished. The enforcement costs, )(k , are 
strictly increasing and strictly convex in the expected marginal penalty. That is, 0)(/ k  and 
0)(// k . The total expected penalties, expressed as )( ii re  , imposed on the firm are 
proportional to the size of violation. The emissions from firms cause some environmental 
damage, )()(
1
Eded
n
i
i 

, where 


n
i
ieE
1
represents aggregate emissions. The damage 
function is strictly increasing and strictly convex in E . 
Let )(Qpp  be the price a firm receives per unit of output, where Q  represents the 
industry’s output.  The price is a linear function of aggregate industry output only. A linear 
demand function assumption allows us to make straightforward statements throughout the 
paper, eliminating ambiguities in the results. Let 

 
ij
ji qq  denote output for the rest of the 
industry except i. Also let ),( ii eqc  represents firm si' cost of output and abatement.  The cost 
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function is strictly increasing and strictly convex in output for a fixed level of emissions. 
Similarly, the cost function is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in emissions for some 
fixed output level. Furthermore, we make the common assumption that output and emissions 
are complements, that is, 0),( iiqe eqc  and the Hessian matrix of the cost function is positive 
definite. The firm also incurs fixed costs of entry F . Fixed costs are important when we 
examine the industry’s equilibrium and/or optimum number of firms as well as the social 
welfare implications of firm si'  choices.  
The profit function for each firm is given by 
                                         )(),()( iiiiiiiii retreqcqqqp    .   (1) 
Note that in the short run fixed costs are irrelevant in (1). 
We now address the nature of the tax imposed on firms that are caught evading a part 
of their emissions tax liabilities. To simplify the analysis we assume that the expected marginal 
penalty for violation is set to induce full compliance. This assumption is supported by recent 
work by Stranlund et al (2009) that suggests that inducing full compliance with a constant 
expected marginal penalty will usually be optimal and that this constant expected penalty 
should be set equal to the emissions tax. Simply, an emissions tax set equal to the expected 
marginal penalty for violation faced by the firm will induce the firm to report only its true level 
of emissions, ii re  . In other words, ii re  if t .    
With the regulator inducing full compliance, the profit function for each firm becomes: 
                                                    iiiiiii teeqcqqqp   ),()(                                           (2) 
Note that (2) does not imply that enforcing the tax has no effect on the firm’s profit function. It 
only indicates that enforcing the tax eliminates any single firm’s incentive to cheat.  
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2.3 Individual choice of Output and Abatement: Comparative Statics 
Firms choose compliance strategies and select iq  and ie  to maximize profit. The first-
order conditions for (2) are: 
                                              
/ ( ) ( ) ( , ) 0;
( , ) 0.
i i i i i q i i
e i i
p q q q p q q c q e
c q e t
     
                                    (3) 
For symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions can be written as   
                                                 
/ ( ) ( ) ( , ) 0;
( , ) 0.
q
e
p nq q p nq c q e
c q e t
  
                                                    (4) 
Equation (4) implicitly defines equilibrium output and emissions for each firm as a function of 
n and t. These solutions can be expressed as: 
                                                          
( , );
( , ).
q q n t
e e n t

                                                                         (5) 
 To examine how the tax and market size affect the profit-maximizing decisions of the 
individual firm, substitute (5) into equations (4) to obtain  
                          
/ ( ( , )) ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ( , ), ( , )) 0;
( ( , ), ( , )) 0.
q
e
p nq n t q n t p nq n t c q n t e n t
c q n t e n t t
  
                                     (6) 
Differentiate (6) with respect to t: 
/ / /( 1) 0;
1 0.
t t qq t qe t
eq t ee t
p nqq n p q c q c e
c q c e
    
     
These can be written in matrix form as 
                         
/ / /( 1) 0
.
1
qq qe t
teq ee
p nq n p c c q
ec c
                   
      (7) 
The determinant of the Hessian matrix in (7) is 2/ ]][)1[( eqeeqq cccpn  , which we require 
to be positive to satisfy the second order condition.  Also, note that the linear demand function 
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assumption implies that 0// p . Hence, from here on we drop the terms involving //p .  
Denote the determinant of the Hessian with S . The solutions for tq and te  in (7) is given by 
ee
qe
t c
c
S
q 

1
01  ;                                                                                                                                  
1
0)1(1 /
eq
qq
t c
cpn
S
e 
 . 
These solutions to can be expressed as follows:  
                                     /
( , ) / 0;
( , ) ( 1) / 0.
t qe
t qq
q n t c S
e n t n p c S
 
                                               (8) 
To see that 0S , re-write it as 2/)1( eqeeqqee ccccpn  . Note that 0qec  and 
02  eqeeqq ccc  is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the cost function which is positive 
definite. Since 0/ p , 0eec , and 0)1( /  eecpn , clearly, 
0]][)1[( 2/  eqeeqq cccpnS .  
Equations (8) characterize the response of an individual firm to changes in the tax. 
Firms’ profit-maximizing output and emissions are decreasing in the tax. The tax serves as a 
deterrent to emissions through output decisions.    
We now turn to the effect of market size on profit-maximizing output and emissions. 
To examine the impact of the size of the market on equilibrium output and emissions 
differentiate (6) with respect to n: 
/ / 2 / / / /( 1) 0;
0.
n n qq n qe n
eq n ee n
p q p q p nqq n p q c q c e
c q c e
      
    
These can be re-written, setting 0// p as 
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











0
)1( /
/
// qp
e
q
cc
ccpn
eeeq
qeqq . 
Solve to obtain 
0
1 /
eq
qe
n c
cqp
S
q 
 ; 
0
)1(1 //
eq
qq
n c
qpcpn
S
e 
 . 
The solution to nq and ne  can be expressed as follows:  
                                                       
/
/
( , ) / 0;
( , ) / 0.
n ee
n eq
q n t p qc S
e n t p qc S
 
                                                       (9) 
Equations (9) characterize the response of an individual firm to an entrant in the market. A 
firm’s profit-maximizing output and emissions are decreasing in the market size. The market 
size factor reflects the ‘business stealing effect’ (Mankiw & Whinston, 1986). That is, output 
per firm falls as the number of firms in the industry increases. Emissions per firm also fall, due 
to a fall in production activity. 
2.4 Optimal Tax with Exogenous Number of Firms 
In this section we examine the nature of an emissions tax that is enforced when market 
entry is blocked. Recall that the social planner sets t . Thus, enforcement costs (k) as a 
function of the tax can be written as )()( ktk  , where )(tk  is strictly increasing and strictly 
convex in the tax, 0)(/ tk  and 0)(// tk . The costs of enforcement we model here are 
resources spent on monitoring a firm’s compliance. The social planner’s objective is to 
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maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus less environmental damage, fixed entry 
and enforcement costs. That is,  
                  ),(0 )()),(()),(),,(()()( tnnqt nFtnktnnedtnetnqncdzzptWMax .              (10) 
In (10) fixed entry costs have no effect on the nature of an optimal emissions tax when there is 
no entry. The optimal tax rate is the solution to (10). To determine this optimal tax rate 
differentiate (10) with respect to t: 
0)(][)( //  tnkendecqcnnqnqp ttetqt . 
The first-order condition implies that we can separate the total social cost of pollution control 
for a given number of firms into pollution control effects, represented by )()( // tnknedc te   
and market imperfections (represented by tq nqcp )(  ). A market imperfection has a balancing 
effect on the cost of pollution control. Note that enforcement costs clearly increase the cost of 
pollution control. 
The optimal tax can be characterized from the first-order condition of (10), by 
substituting tce   from equation (4) and solving for t.  That is, 
0)()( //  tkedteqcqnqp tttqt . 
implies 
                                                 
tt
t
q e
tk
e
qcpdt )()(
/
/*  .                                                  (11) 
*t  is the optimal tax for a given number of identical firms, /d is the marginal damage from 
emissions, 0)(  qcp is the price premium for the oligopoly and )(/ tk represents marginal 
enforcement costs. The price premium is weighted by the substitution between output and 
emissions induced by a higher tax.  
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In a perfectly competitive market where qcp  and there are no enforcement costs 
associated with the tax the result in (11) is the Pigouvian tax. The optimal tax equals marginal 
damage in a perfectly competitive market with a fixed number of industry participants if there 
are no enforcement costs. 
   In an oligopolistic market where qcp  imperfect competition tends to make the 
optimal tax less than marginal damage; this is the Oates and Strassmann (1984) result. This 
implies that an optimal tax rate imposed on firms with some market power would have to be 
adjusted downward to account for such market distortions.  
Equation (11) shows that in addition to an adjustment factor to account for an 
inefficiency associated with less than competitive output of an imperfectly competitive 
industry, we have another adjustment factor to account for the costs of enforcing the tax. This 
additional adjustment is represented by tetk )(
/ . This is the per-firm marginal enforcement 
cost of inducing lower emissions with a higher tax. A higher tax is required to reduce 
emissions ( 0te ). But a higher tax is associated with higher enforcement costs ( 0)(/ tk ). In 
general, we have shown that firms will typically respond to the tax by choosing lower 
emissions. Hence, the regulator chooses a higher tax to reduce emissions. However, a higher 
tax increases the incentive to cheat. Cheating can only be deterred by increased enforcement 
and this is costly.  
Overall, for a given number of firms enforcing an emissions tax results in an optimal 
tax rate smaller than the social marginal damage when there are no market imperfections. The 
cost of enforcement constitutes the main contrast between the result here and the rest of the 
literature on the impact of market structure on an emissions tax. The Oates and Strassmann 
result indicates that market imperfections result in the optimal tax that is smaller than marginal 
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damage. In (11), enforcement costs further push the optimal tax lower than marginal damage in 
an imperfectly competitive industry. This is because enforcing the tax simply adds to the social 
cost of pollution control. 
2.5 Market Entry and the Optimal Tax 
We now examine the nature of an optimal emissions tax with endogenous entry. Unlike 
in the case of an optimal tax with a fixed number of firms, the equilibrium number of firms in 
this case is endogenously determined. In choosing the tax the regulator accounts for the effect 
on the tax of firms’ entry decisions. Specifically, in a three-stage game, the regulator chooses a 
tax t and an enforcement strategy. The identical Cournot firms observe the tax and the 
regulator’s enforcement strategy and then decide whether or not to enter the market. Firms that 
enter the market choose their compliance strategies, output and abatement by maximizing 
profit. A firm enters the market if and only if its profit covers the fixed cost of entry. The 
solution to the game is found by backward induction.  
The equilibrium number of firms for a given tax rate and fixed entry costs implied by 
the zero-profit condition is defined by  
                                                                0),(  Ftn .                                                        (12) 
This implicitly defines the equilibrium number of firms as a function of the tax and fixed costs, 
),( tFn . The optimal tax given endogenous entry is the solution to 
                                  nqt nFtnknedeqncdzzpttFnWMax 0 )()(),()()),,(( ,   (13) 
where ),( tFnn  , )),,(( ttFnqq  , and )),,(( ttFne  . The first order condition for (13) is: 
                          
       
 / /
( ) . ( ) ( ) ;
( ) ( ) 0.
t n t t t q n t t e n t t
t n t t t t
p n q n q n q n c nc q n q nc e n e
d n e n e n e n k nk n F
      
                         (14) 
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Equation (14) determines the optimal tax when the number of firms is endogenous, and can be 
re-written as  
0)(][][][ //  nkknEdenencqcpnqcpnnFcpqn ttttnetqnqtt . 
To determine the effect of endogenous number of firms and enforcement costs on the 
optimal tax we first need to determine the signs of ),( tFnt and ),( tnEt .  ),( tFnt  represents the 
effect of the tax on entry while ),( tnEt  represents the effect of the tax on aggregate emissions. 
To determine the sign of ),( tFnt , substitute the equilibrium number of firms, ),( tFn , into 
(12) to obtain 
                                                       0)),,((  FttFn                                                          (15) 
Differentiate (15) with respect to t and solve for ),( tFnt  as follows: 
0)),,((),()),,((  ttFntFnttFn ttn ; 
                                              )),,((/)),,((),( ttFnttFntFn ntt  .     (16) 
Hence, the sign of ),( tFnt  depends on the sign of )),,(( ttFnt  and )),,(( ttFnn .  
)),,(( ttFnt  is the effect of the tax on the firm’s profit while )),,(( ttFnn is the effect of 
entry on the firm’s profit. Thus, the effect of the tax on the equilibrium number of firms 
depends on how entry and the tax affect individual firms’ profit. First, we discuss the effect of 
entry on the firm’s profit. 
To determine of the effect of entry on the profit level for an individual firm, substitute 
the equilibrium output and emissions levels in (5) into (2). That is, 
                               0),()),(),,((),(),((),(  tntetnetnqctnqtnnqptn .                     (17) 
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Differentiate (17) with respect to n to obtain  nqnennn qcetcpqqnqqp  ][)(/ . 
From (4) tce  ; thus, 0][  ne etc . Also, using (4) we can express nq qcp )(   as nqqp / . 
n  can then be re-written as nn qqpqnqqp // )(  . This can further be reduced to: 
                                                     ])1([/ nn qnqqp  .                                                    (18) 
Recall that 0/ p and therefore 0/ qp .  Hence, 0n if 0)1(  nqnq . To see that 
0)1(  nqnq , substitute Sqcpq een /)( /  from equation (9), where 
2/ ]][)1[( eqeeqq cccpnS  . Substituting nq  into nqnq )1(   yields Sqcpnq ee /)1( /  
SqcpnSq ee /])1([
/ . Sq  alone can be expressed as ][)1( 2/ eqeeqqee cccqqcpn  . The 
whole expression SqcpnSq ee /])1([
/  becomes  
Sqcpncccqqcpn eqeeqqee /])1(][)1([
/2/  Scccqqcp eqeeqqee /]][2[ 2/   . This is 
positive because of the convexity of the cost function discussed earlier. Thus, 
0])1([/  nn qnqqp . 0n says that profits are decreasing in the Nash equilibrium 
number of firms. Note that this is in line with the business stealing effect discussed earlier. 
That is, for a given price, each additional firm in the market results in smaller output per firm. 
A decrease in the firm’s output lowers its profit level. 
To determine the sign of )),,(( ttFnt , differentiate (17) with respect to t to obtain 
eteecqcpqnqqp ttetqttt  / eetcqcpnqp tetq  ][][ / . We have shown in 
(8) that 0tq and that tce   in equation (4). Thus, we can re-write )),,(( ttFnt  as 
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                                             eqcpnqpttFn tqt  )()),,(( / .                                       (19) 
Taxes increase the cost of business, as seen in (2). Therefore, it is expected that an increase in 
the tax should result in a lower profit for the firm, that is, 0)),,((  ttFnt . In our model this 
holds if 0/  qcpnqp , such that  0)()),,(( /  eqcpnqpttFn tqt , 0e  and 
0tq as shown in (8). 0)),,((  ttFnt simply implies that in addition to its role of restricting 
emissions the tax also acts as an entry barrier. 
 Note that the requirement that 0)),,((  ttFnt  if 0/  qcpnqp  may not hold in 
all market structures, for example, perfect competition. In perfect competition there is no price 
premium, that is, 0 qcp  and 0/ nqp . This suggests that (19) may in fact be ambiguous 
or even positive. However, a positive outcome would be counterintuitive to the role of the tax 
as production cost element. 
We have discussed the conditions under which 0)),,((  ttFnn  and 
0)),,((  ttFnt . It follows that in (16) 0),( tFnt . This means that the tax acts as an entry 
barrier, increasing the tax restricts the equilibrium number of firm. 
We now examine the effect of increasing the tax on aggregate emissions to determine 
the sign of ),( tnEt . Since we have assumed identical firms, aggregate emissions as a function 
of the tax can be expressed as: 
                                      )),,((),()),,(( ttFnetFnttFnE  .                                                    (20) 
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Differentiate (20) with respect to t to obtain tntttntt neneenenenenE  )()( . 
Assuming that the ultimate goal of the tax is to serve as a deterrent to emissions, we expect 
aggregate emissions to be decreasing in the tax. We have already shown that 0tn , 0te  
and 0ne . Thus, 0tE  holds if 0 nnee .  Note that )( nt neen  represents the marginal 
effect of the tax per-firm emissions. Hence, we expect that if emissions per firm are decreasing 
in the tax, then aggregate emissions ultimately will be decreasing in the tax as well, that is, 
0tE . If 0 nnee  then the effect of the tax on aggregate emissions may be ambiguous, a 
general result that others have obtained, for example, Requate (2005). Or it is possible that the 
tax results in higher aggregate emissions, a result counterintuitive to the goal of the tax. Such 
an outcome can be envisioned for a policy that is focused solely on revenue generation 
It is important to note that the tax has direct and indirect effects on aggregate emissions. 
The direct impact of the tax on aggregate emissions obtains from the role of the tax as a 
deterrent to individual firm’s emissions. The indirect effect of the tax on aggregate emissions, 
represented by ent  reflects the role of the tax as an entry barrier. The tax results in a smaller 
number of firms and this in turn results in lower aggregate emissions.  
To obtain the optimal tax from (13) first re-write the first-order condition as  
0)(][][][ //  nkknEdenencqcpnqcpnnFcpqn ttttnetqnqtt . 
Using the zero profit condition, 0),()(  Fteeqcqnqp , substituting tce   from (3) 
and re-arranging the terms we obtain the optimal tax given endogenous entry as 
                                            
t
t
t
nttq
E
tnkkn
E
qnqcp
dt )(
))(( //**  .                              (21) 
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In (21) /d is the marginal damage associated with emissions. The term 
tq qcp )(  represents the adjustment for market imperfections, weighted by the substitution 
between individual firms’ output and aggregate emissions induced by a higher tax. The third 
welfare effect of the tax under endogenous entry implied by Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 
(1995) is represented by ntq qncp )(  . Recall that one welfare effect of the tax is the reduction 
in emissions, the second is the reduction in output and the third is that the tax limits the number 
of firms in the industry. Hence, ntt qnq   represents the second and third welfare effects, acting 
as a balance on one another. In the absence of enforcement costs, if the output effects exceed 
the size effects of the tax then the results is an optimal emissions tax smaller that marginal 
social damage. On the other hand, a size effect stronger than the output effect of the tax leads 
to an optimal tax that exceeds the marginal social damage.  
The solution above shows that enforcement costs have direct and indirect effects, with a 
countervailing influence on the optimal tax when entry is endogenous. The direct effect of 
enforcement costs on the optimal tax is represented by tEtnk /)(
/ , the per-firm marginal 
enforcement costs of inducing lower aggregate emissions through a higher tax.  Since 
0/)(/ tEtnk  the direct effect of enforcement costs is to push down the optimal tax. On the 
other hand, the indirect effect of enforcement costs on the optimal tax, through the market size,  
is represented by tt Ekn / . This is the change in enforcement costs achieved by reducing the 
market size and aggregate emissions through a higher tax. Since 0/ tt Ekn  the indirect effect 
of enforcement costs is to push the tax up. 
The optimal tax, assuming there are no market imperfections, is greater than marginal 
damage if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of enforcement costs.  The optimal tax 
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would be smaller than marginal damage if the indirect effect falls short of the direct effect of 
enforcement costs.  
2.6 Conclusions and Further Research 
We have examined the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’ emissions are 
not perfectly observable under both perfect competition and Cournot competition with and 
without free market entry. We have shown that for a given number of firms enforcing an 
emissions tax results in an optimal tax rate smaller than the social marginal damage when there 
are no market imperfections. The optimal tax reduces further when there are market 
imperfections. The policy implication here is that an optimal tax rate imposed on firms with 
some market power would have to be adjusted downward to account for such market 
distortions and enforcement costs. Enforcement pushes the optimal tax lower from marginal 
damage because enforcing the tax simply adds to the social cost of pollution control.  
Enforcement costs have direct and indirect effects, with a countervailing influence on 
the optimal tax when entry is endogenous. In this case, the direct effect of enforcement costs, 
represented by the per-firm marginal enforcement costs of inducing lower aggregate emissions 
through a higher tax on the optimal tax is negative and therefore pushes down the optimal tax. 
On the other hand, the indirect effect of enforcement costs on the optimal tax is positive and 
hence pushes the tax up. The optimal tax, assuming there are no market imperfections, is 
greater than marginal damage if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of enforcement 
costs and the optimal tax would be smaller than marginal damage if the indirect effect falls 
short of the direct effect of enforcement costs.  
It is well established that the equilibrium number of firms is greater than the optimal 
number of firms even in the absence of an emissions tax (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).  A tax 
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has the tendency to reduce this gap between the equilibrium and optimal number of firms (Lee, 
1999; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995). As a result, it might be possible that a joint 
determination of the optimal emissions tax and number of firms yield results different from the 
ones in this paper. I leave this issue for future work.  
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